Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1952

Public Opinion and the Portsmouth Conference
Bernadette Long
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Long, Bernadette, "Public Opinion and the Portsmouth Conference" (1952). Master's Theses. 1111.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/1111

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1952 Bernadette Long

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POM'SllOUTH CONFERENCE

A '!'beds
Presented to

the Facul:ty

or

the Depart.ment of History

Loyola Univenity

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

tor

the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Bernadette Long
Pebruary 19S2

TABLE OF CON'l.'F.N'l'S
Ohapter I

Background of the Oonference • • • .. • .. • • .. • .. • .. . .. .. • • • ••

1

a. United states interest in the Orient
b. Attitude of the American people toward the war
c. '!'he arrival ot the plenipotentiaries
Ohapter II
!he Opening of the Oonference.

. . ..

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• :L7

a. Presentation of Japan 1 s terms
b. Russia t 8 reply
c. Controversial points
d. Olose of the conference

Chapter

m

The Attitude of the American People toward Russia and Japan. • • • ...

27

a. Ohange in sentiment toward Russia and Japan

b. Russia t s attempt to change American opinion
c. '1'he effects ot the peaoe terms on the public
Ohapter IV

'lhe Results of the Oonference. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. ••

4l.

a. Effects ot the peace terms in Japan and Russia
b. American attitude toward the peace terms
o. RooseYelt's role as peaee-maker acola1msd
Oonclusion. • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

..

. .. . -. . . .. . .
.-

. .. . .. .. . .. . . • • . .. . . . • • • • . .. • •
1

• •

• • •• 54

• •

. .. ... 59

IN!RODUCTION
The Ib1Sso-Japanese War was brought to a close by the Portsmouth

Oonference.

The idea of a conference - s initiated by the two belligerents

themselves and by President Roosevelt who offered mediation.

The underlying

causes in their desire for peace may never be brought to the foreground; h0w-

ever, the study of the events leading to the conference, and the progress and
results of the conference bring out pertinent factors whioh may point out h1dden causes for seeldng peace.

By pointing out public thought as printed in

the United States journals of opinion and llEftIISPapers, an attempt has been

made to show the influence, if arr::f, that public opinion may have had upon the
decision of those figuring in the peace plans.

If public thought had no

influence in this regard this part of the survey may serve as an index of
public thought at that period.

fbis study, then, sets out to find the trend in public thought prior
to the peace negotiations, during the Portsmouth Oonference and after peace

arrangements had been made. The study also attempts to compare the opinion of
the American people at one phase of the developments with evidences of public

thought at other stages of the negotiations and an attempt has been made to
point out cond! tiona which may haTe caused the American people to shift in
sentiment from one of indifference to a definite s,mpa.thy toward Japan and
ii

later to an almost hostile attitude toward the Japanese people as is pointed.
..,
out as the story of public opinion regarding the Portsmouth Conference unfolds ..

iii

...

BACKGROUND OF THE PORTSMOUTH

COmr~E

During the latter part of the nineteen.th century the relations
be1m'een the United states and Japan had been friendly.

Not only were there

no serious differences in governmental affairs in that period, but the

people of both countries were kindly disposed to eaoh other.

The people

at

both Japan and the United states had had few ocoasions to demonstrate their
good 1'lill toward each other; therefore their regard for eaoh other developed
into a lukewarm feeling whioh was taken for granted.
this mutual sentiment in the following way:

tf •••

Payson J. Treat viewed

it may be said that the

American people so far as they are informed ooncerning Far Eastern affairs,

were interested in and well disposed to Ja.pan."

1

Interest in the Far East,

therefore, did not originate with President Theodore Roosevelt's aotivities
in the war between the Russians and the Japanese; interest in the Far East
had begun before the turn of the oentury whioh saw the United States emerge
as a world power.

The development of the United states as a world power gave impetus

to new

and varied interests in the Far East.

The possession of the Hawaiian

1 Payson J. Treat, tfbn and the United States, 1853-1921
(Stanford, Ca.lifornia: Stanto
niversrEY Fress,
p. 187

me"

1

2
and Ph111ppine...Islands as well as the growth of population and commerce on
t..~

Pacific Coast, trade in the Far East and the building of the Panama

Canal. were, in the eyes of most historians, factors which caused the United
states to look toward Asia. 2

Byl9Q; I the eyes of the American people were focused on Asia for
a number of reasons.

In looking toward Asia, European polities also came

into view because there exists an interdependence between tar eastern

policies and developments in Europe. 3
'!'he Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 did not stand as an isolated

policy and may not be tairly judged without considering the events in
Europe, the Near East and other parts

ot the Far F.a.st as wel1. 4

tries were indirectly involved in the war.

!fa.ny

coun-

Korea and Manchuria played a

large part in the contlict but the more remote pawns in the contestHawaii and the Philippines caused the American nation and lfr. Roosevelt to

become even more concerned about the war's outcome..

Tyler Dennett points

out this tact when he tells Us that it is a false assumption to think that
the Far F..astern conflict was merely a contest tor Korea.
Korea was one ot the pawns I though
a one as Manchuria ....Morocco •••was
perhaps we ahall conclude that the
American government to protect her
•

He wrote:

not so important
another,. and
desire of the
possessions in

4 .....

2 Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the RUSSo-Ja~ese War (Garden
Doubleday Page arid compi'ny. 19~~)" p.
-

City, New York:

-

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

Hawa;i.i and the ~hilippines was also a. factor in
the settlement.;J
Formerly the desire to check European aggression in China. had
resulted in the formation of the Open D,::,or.

Economic and mili:ta.ry

penetration in this area continued to advance to the point that a settlement had to be made.

'lhe question that arose from the conflict between the

Russian and the Japanese governments was:

who will be the undisputed ruler

of the Pacific-Russia or Japan? '!'his change of events affected .American
economic interests directly, and was a possible threat to political and
social developments in the future",

The average American wa.s unaware of the importance of Far Eastern
events.

Mr. Dulles points out reasons why Americans as a wholA were un-

interested in these matters at the time.

He said:

•••while the country was still a little intoxicated
its proud status as a new world power and the
energetic Mr. Roosevelt was not only prepared but
eager to dabble in international polities in other
parts of' the world, the man on the street found
interests near at home more important. 6
by

The A.merican people. s attitude toward Japan, then, was one of

friendly indiff'ere.."lCe; but because the public objected to Russian
aggression in Manchuria, talk of the "Muscovite Perlln began to spread

.5

-

Ibid.

6 Foster Rhea Dulles, FortZ Years of American Japanese Relations
(New York:

D. Appleton Century Company, !~7r; p. 5~

4
even in the eo~ersation of the man on the street.?
In 1903 President Roosevelt had become alarmed because of the
Russian advance into Manchuria.

Because he feared this action he wrote

Secretary of state John Hay concerning Russia.

In this note Mr. Roosevelt

stated that he would go to any extreme if Russia oontinued her policy in
Ma.nchuria. 8 1Ia.ny thought, havrever, t~t :Mr. Roosevelt had gone a little
too far in his statement.

Hr. Dulles said that people would not have

backed Mr. Roosevelt in this action.
only

mi~

FIe pointed out that the public was

aroused, and although the press featured such articles as

"Is Russia to Establish a Universal :&!pire?". "Russiata Conquest of AB1a")
and dShall Russia Dominate the Warld?", no 'Vital interest of theirs was at

stalce in lIanelnlrla.

They knew too little about Manchuria and it was too

far away.9 Host of the material written in this period shows that the

American public favored Japan, however, there is no evidence at the early
stages of the negotiations that the public was aroused toward Russia.
sentiment toward Japan had a moral basis:

The

the American public disliked

Russia's lack of good faith in not keeping her word in evacuating ManehuriatD

-

7 Ibid.
8 Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Tehera.n (Princeton, New

Jersey:

Princeton University PreiS'; I9L1i);-p':'8o

-

9 Ibid.

5
Forei<gn investors had frequently warned the State Department o.f
the dangerous situation in Manchuria.

Journallsts, foreign investors and

govermnental officials had for a long time been aware that po.ssible commercial and politioal changes might be the result of Russiats penetration in
Manchuria. 11
Oorrespondence continued between Mr. Roosevelt and Secretary' at

.

State Hay concerning the Russian advance into Ohina.

The President even

went so far as tD say that the Russian diplomats deceived the United States
wi th "brazen and contemptuous e:f'f'ron'teryf' wh:1le at the same time they

attempted to organize Ohine. against our interests. 12 America and European
powers complained of Russiats penetration into China.

In answer to these

complaints Oount Ouaint, the Russian Ambassador in Washington, pointed out
that China was al.ready being dismembered by ma..nT countries, and because of
these prevailing circumstances J Russia would never withdraw from Uanchuria. lJ

JIr. Roosevelt's policy in the Far East at this time was ltenthusi:astically endorsed by the people.·14 No transition was necessary when
Secretary of state Hay was sent abroad in March for his bealth. Mr. Roosevelt

--

11 Dulles, Road to. Teheran, p. 86-87
12

-

Ibid.

-

13 Ibid.

-

14 Ibid.

6
had for some t:tme nv1rtua.lly been his own secretary of state. "lS Regarding

Mr. Roosevelt's dual position as president and secretary of state, several
comments vrore madel

A Japanese minister said, "'l'he president is certa.:f.nl.y

introdUCing a new school of diplomacy. n16 Wh1 tnay Griswold quoted another
statement which said that the PreSident laid himself open to knocks which
should have been taken by the Seoret&r7of State. 17 "Few presidents, said

.

Mr. Griswold, "have exerted such an arbi tNry control of foreign poliey- as

Theodore Roosevelt. nlS The President shared oonfidences chieflywith three
men:

Sir Cecil Spring-R1oe, Baron Speck Van Sternbury, and Jusserand. 19
Mr. Roosevelt's favor was sought for

m&ny'

reasons. The Japanese

government told President Roosevelt of its readiness for his good offices. 20
German;,v also sought Roosevelt's favor.

German,r's policy had been to push

Russia along in Manchur1a. 21 !his design ot the Ka1ser was to help the Ozar
win Manchuria and to share with him the partitioning

ot North Ohina in return

for Russian concessions in middle Europe and :north east to the Berlin to

-

•

-

15 Ibid.
Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern pr~ of the United States
Haroourt Brace and OonIPanY,; 1938, p.
- --

16
(New York:

--

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.

-

19 Ibid.
20 Samuel Flagg BemiS, Diplomatio
(New York. Henry Holt, 1930), p. Ji~
21 Griswold, p.

94

H:f.s~

of the United States

--

7
Bagdad poliey a!!d

the Drang.!!!Sh Osten. 22 The Ka1ser knew that this scheme

would be detected if he openly became involved in this diplomatic intrigue;

tbere£ore he appealed to Mr. Roosevelt through the German M'inister, Sternburg,

to sunmone the belligerents to observe the neutrality of China outside the
sphere of military operations-that is outside of Manchuria. and North Ohina. 23
Samuel Bemis also stated that the Kaiser was planning an alliance

.

with RUSsia, so he wanted to win Rooseveltts support for that cause. 24

Roosevelt had let Japan know that he thought that they deserved to have
Korea and Secretary of state Hayls note on the "open door" had ignored
Koroo. 2S Mr. Roosevelt asked one condition for his services:

that Japan

pledge herself to the doctrine of "open doortt in Manchuria. Great Britian

stayed clear of these negotiations. 26
Prior to the actual offer of good office to the two belligerents,
Mr. Roosevelt had on lIarch 9, written

to Sir George Tevelyan saying that he

had privately and unofficially advised Russia to sue for peace. 27 This
action and other diplomatic maneuvering preceeded President Rooseveltts official peace proposal.
4"

Mention of peace also had been made to King Edward

•

24

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
Bemis, p.

491

-

25 Ibid.

-

26 Ibid.
27 Joseph Bucklin, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920)" p. ~'f>..j-m
--

8
of England. 28 aoth the Russian Ambassador, Oount Ca.ssini, and the Japanese
Minister Koretiyo 'l'akahira had vis:1 ted Washington, making peace overtures; 29
hOwever, peaoe negotiations did not seem hopei"ul because neither of the
....arr1ng countries lm.nted to appear to be the first to accept peaoe measures)O
Mr. Roosevelt gave a summary of this situation in his autobiogra.ph1'.3l

In

his chapter entitled "The Peace ot Righteousness" .. Mr. Roosevelt wrote:
During the early part of the year 1905 the strain on
the civilized world caused by' the Russo-Japanese War
became serious.. The losses of life and of treasure
were trightful from all sources of information at
home. I grew most strongly to believe that a further
continuation of the struggle would be a very bad
~2
thing for Japan, and an even worse thing for Russia. ~
Mr. Roosevelt in his next statement minimized the effects of

Japanese victories in the PacifiC, by assuming that Russian victory would
have a d.amag:tng atfect on the future.

Be continued saying" ..... Japan might

have met defeat. and defeat to her would have spelt overwbel.ming disaster ••• "3
The next statement tells

ot

Mr. Roosevelt's peace offer:

ttl believed, there-

fore, that the time had come when it was greatly to the interest of both

combatants to have peace .... 834
When Mr. Roosevelt thought it possible to get both to agree to

--

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 377
)0

-

Ibid.

31 Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt (New York:
Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 540

-

32 Ibid.

-

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

Oharles

9
peace, he sent identical notes to the two powers proposing that they meet
through their representatives

to see whether peace could. be made. Mr.

Roosevelt offered to act as an 1ntermedisr.r in bringing about this meeting)$
An article in the

.!!! !2!!! .;;;;,;Tim;;;,;.;;;;;;eB... from

secure peace. !his statement said:

St. Petersburg denied attempts to

"From all information obtainable it is

regarded as certain that aotual negotiations for peaoe between the belli.g-

.

erents are not yet underw&yJ 36 from Paris oame a. denial that Minister
De Lacasse' and Dr. Montono, the Japanese minister, were taking an aotive

part in the negotiations for peace.;37 and Jusserand who had visited the
president in Washington said, "I do not think the gO"l'ertml.ent of the Un! ted
States is oonsidering as yet any offensive move toward intervention.",3B
Efforts between Russia and Japan to settle differences peacef'ully
had never ceased from the outbreak of hostilities.

mediation had been offered.

Four different ldnds of

One sought to br1ng about peaoe through an in-

ternational conference, England and France

&8

allies of the belligerents

offered mediation; the Um. ted States because of ita neutral status was a
possible souroe from whioh :rna.ny thought mediation might stem; the possibility

-

3$ Ibid., p. $4l

-

,38 Ibid.

10
that negotiatiou between the two belligerents themselves might bring peaoe

was also a source of hope to the non-military factors in each government. 39
"1 made nry first move in the negotiation on their requesttt , Jfr.
Roosevelt wrote Senator Oabot Ledge. ho The Japanese in their appeal tor
peace wanted the United States to aot as a ttneutral"" they wanted to conduct
negotiations directly with Russia. h1 Of his action, Mr. Roosevelt said in
hie autobiography', "1 first satisfied myself that each side wished me to
act, but that naturally and properly each side was exceedingly anxious that
the other should not believe that the aotion was taken on its own im.tia-

tive. nh2 It was at this time that the president sent identical notes to
both Russia and Japan proposing that they meet through their representat1ves

to see whether peace could be brought about by such a meeting.
'!'he Russo-Japanese War had begun February

1904.

!he sympathetic

attitude toward Japan was strengthened by the general beliet that Japan had
entered the 'War after suttering much humiliation by Russia. 43 Secretary'
Root justitied the Japanese cause in comnencing the war and even praised the
Nipponese for their "frankness" and "meticulousness" in minimizing the cause

ot the controversy. Lh
•

39 Dennett, p. 170

40 Joseph E. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times (New York:
Oharles Scribnerts Sons, 1920), p. j8!
- U

Roosevelt, p.

43 .!!!!2!':!!

S40

42 Ibid.

4h

Daily 'l'imes ..

Arthur Judson Brown, !he Master,x
Cu,",,,·les Scr1bner f s SOl'l8, 1919), p.
1..._

m:o

Far East,
-ot -the -

<New York.

II

Although Russia was much larger and supposedly possessed a more

power£u.l military machine, she had lost much in the struggle with the Japanese.

It was improbable that she would be mOl'"€ able to defend Eastern Siberia

and Northern !lanchuria than she bad been able to defend. Southern Manchuria
and

Korea.~ Japan, too, suffered tremendous losses f!oom the lack of proper

resources and the drain on her

men.46

.Further continuation of the struggle,

thought Mr. Roosevelt, would be a very bad thing for Japan and even worse
for Russia. 47
In the spring and summer of 1905, the Japanese millta.ry and naval
leaders left their posts for Tokyo to insist that the Cabinet malea peace.

48

Russia IS fleet had been annihilated, her al'll\Y had been disastrously defeated,
her railway connections were entirely inadequate; moreover, she was oonfronted with finanoial and political distress.49 Although the war map

was in

Japants favor, her financial status like Russia's was poor and. they had
paid dearly for each advance.

Russia used French loans and Japan received

loans from both Great Britian50 and the United. states.)l In a New York

--

Times
financial section, a report praised Japan t s t:1.nancial ai tuation.
,

It

.11

h5 Theodore Roosevelt (revlsed 00..), p. 583

46
47
48
49

-

Ibid.

Ibid.

Griswold, p. 118

Brown, p. 178-180

SO The President of the Kuhn Loeb Company was deoorated after the
War by the King for his cooperation with the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Bishop,
p. 381
$1 Jewish bankers used war loans to Japan as a means of retaliation
tor Russiafs barbaric anti-semitism. Griswold, p. 1.05'

12
also revealed tke fact that public opinion played an important part in the
stock markets b.1 causing speculators to strive more desperately to speculate
which country would be victorious.

A one hundred and fifty million dollar

($1.50,000,000) Japanese loan was floated in New York.

The report stated

that French buyers were "hedging" to gain from Japan possible losses from
Russia.

(The article itself stated that this was not a universal belief.)>2
Considerable hesitation ensued between the writing of the peace

notes and the acceptance by the belligerents.

The Japanese people thought

the time was too early for peace and that the very least to expeot for
indemnity from Russia would be 1,.500,000,000 yen• .53

There was also the

general feeling in Japan that unless thoroughly satisfaotory terms were
reached, there would be no peaoe.
capture Harbin and Vla.d1V08took.

They thought that. they should first

Other Japanese demands involved Saghal1en.

They thought Japan should have Saghalien because therein laid the chief
source of fear in insuring supremacy of the Sea of Japan .. S4 Sato regarding
this said that it merely represented edt torial opinions and would do no harm ..
•

I

_ ....

52 New York Times, April 2, 190.5

--

53 Vasujior Iskikawa editor ot the Hooi Shimbun, a Tokyo newspaper as reported in Bew York Tribune. Some wIifi.id Indemnity of .5 billion
yen £rom Russia.
.

.54 New York
-

Tribune" August 1" 1905.

He also said, "iome people in Japan might think it is too early to end the

war, but the general opinion favors cessation of 108ses. 1155

The Russian

ease was complicated further by; conflicting messages between Mr. Ueyer and
count Cassin!; the public's idea of probable peace terms and concessions,
and domestic troubles.
The notes to the Czar and the Mikado offered the friendly services
of the United States in arranging the time and place of the meeting.
Japan accepted the offer of the President June 10, the Russians
sent word of their acceptance two dqs later, June 12, 1905.
arose regarding the meeting place.
Paris, the Hague, and Washington.

56

conflict

Suggestions tor possible places were:
Washington was chosen tor the meeting

place, but the conference waa arranged at Portsmouth, New Hampshire because
of inclimate weather in Washington.

Further delay was caused by the suspicion

of the Japanese that Russia was not sending its top men; someone who could
actually carry on negotiations sf.tOuld an agreement be reached.

At first

President Roosevelt had tried to get the names of the plenipotentiaries
and keep ita secret.

It was soon disclosed that the Japanese had appointed

Baron Komura and Mr. 1C0retiyo Takahira; the Russians had appointed Count
Witte and Baron Rosen. 57

-.------55
56

Ibid.

Ward and others, Cambri~e Modern History. XII (New York:
The 'Macmillan Company, 1910), p. 600

57 Brown, p.

182

The nwn selected were impressive figures and met with the public's
approval.

Mr. Takahira

was the acting minister in the United States.

had a thorough knowledge of the details. 58

He

Baron lomura was a Harvard man

of much diplomatic experience, having previously been minister to Korea,
China, and Russia. 59 Baron Rosen, the new minister to the United States
succeeding Count Cassini was well known in the United States having previously spent eight years as Secretary of the Russian Embassy and four years
60
Counsel General in New York.
Al though disliked by the Grand Ducal party in
Russia, llr. Witte was generally liked elsewhere and had been known as an

exponent of peace from his actions in the war of his country and Japan and
outward statements by the former tinance minister regarding his desire for
peace.
The American public was eager to begin festivities the moment the

representatives arrived.
was given credit

They found Sergyi.e Witte a colorful figure.

tor "planting . .eds of undying friendship

He

with Russia. tt 6J.

The Japanese were the more reserved representatives, the general

concept concerning Japanese representatives seemed to be more remote yet not

5& William Elliot Griffis, The Japanese Nation in Evolution,
(London: George Harrap and CO!'pany, 19m, p. 377-379
-

59 Brown, p. 184

-

60 Ibid.
61 J. Hapgood, Ambassador ~..! Inttich Witt.e Russia's Van
the Hour, Craftsmen, IX (November l~o",p-:-l57
. -

--

ot

-

15
unf'r1endly to Ute .American public.

62

Thus the scene for the Portsmouth Conference was set.

Russia and

Japan had engaged in hostilities which upset and endangered the oommercial
and political balanoe of the world. 63 Eaoh oountry wanted peaoe, but neither
wanted to take the initia.tive in Bueing for peace since they thought an
action of this kind would a.dmit defeat. 64
Japan had gained the

mOB t

6

ground J

5

It was generally believed that

.

yet she had suffered tremendously.

U

lir. Roosevelt offered to set up a suitable place where the two could negotiate

peace.

This otfer was accepted by both countries and their "impressive lf

representatives came to the United States.
At this time it .,. be pointed out that the public was skeptical
concerning the success of the conference.

An example of a public s tatamen t

regarding the possible failure of the conference is Mr. Stra.eheyts statement,
The pea.ce conference is about to meet but chances are
unfa.vorable for peace. The Russians who were entirely
unable tg7make war seem now entirely unable to make
peace •••

Vr. Roo.evel t shared the skepticism in the efree tiveness of the

conference in a letter to Senator KllUte Nelson of Uinnesota. when he wrote:

62 W. D. Hmmlls, The Peacemakers at Portsmouth, Harperts Weekly
XLIX (August 26, 1244-1904). -

63 Dennett, p. 6

64

Roosevelt, p.

65

~.

-

540

66 Ibid.

67 Bishop, p. 401

16
I have not an idea whether I can or can not get peace •••
I have done m:I best I have led t.he horse to water, but
heaven only knows whether they will ~gnk or start
kicking one another under the trough.

---...

...._68

-Ibid., p. 398

CHAPTER II
THE PROCEEDINGS OF '!'HE PORTSMOUTH CONF'E.i'tBNCE
The American press was tilled with descriptions of the plenipotentaries, and outward celebrations were 'held in honor of the delegates.
actual meetings remained secret.

The

No attempt has been made to recapture every

detail of the demonstrations in honor of the Portsmouth Conference, only that
which seems to reflect public thought printed in the press has been stated
here.

Some detail has been given to characterize the delegates as it is the

belief of

m~

writers that the personalities of the delegates themselves did

much to sway public thought.

The most colorful figure in the negotiations was Sergius Witte.
was chosen to succeed Murants!f.
Minister of Finance.

He

In 1903 Witte was forced to resign as

He had realized before the war that the Itaggressive

policy of Viceroy Alexieff and M. Bezobrazoff in the Tuu Timber company
would eventual~ drive Japan to war."l H1s relations with Japan had been
friendly.

He had received an invitation trom Marguis Ito to visit their

country in 1903.

From the time Ur. Witte first set foot on .American shores

until he left, he was followed by a crowd.

He seBl1ed to realize that his

task was to ....in the American people and he sensed that this could be done by

17

making friends with the press and the crowds.

On his arrival, still aboard

the Kaiser Wilhelm dar Grosse, he thanked the American newspapers for their

hospitality on his first visit.

He said that it touohed him greatly to

realize the vas t power of the United states t press. 2
2.00 a.m. to meet the Russian "man of desttny.u3

Crowds had awai ted trom

Never betore has it been

in one man' s power to ask his sovereign such changes as those Which Wi tte has
demanded and obtained trom Nioholas

I~,

oommented a wri tar in

Outloo~. 4

A ~ical report in an American newspaper regarding the arrival of
the delega tea read:

'l'he peace squardron will arrive at Oyster Bay about noon
and anchor. Its arrival will be heralded by the firing
of an ambassadorial salute of 19 guns for each mission
from the Galveston, Mayflower and Dolph1n which will be
waiti.ng to convey the p1enipotentaries to the Portsmouth
Conference. The President will arrive at about one
o'clock and receive the presidential salute of 21 guns
from all ships in the harbor. The presidential flag
will be hoisted on the lfIqf'loWer. The Japanese envoys
will cooe abroad and be presented by the ac ting Secretary
of State Piel'ce. One-halt hour later the Russian envoys ••• 5
It was generally that the conduct ot aftairs was ot the highest
order.

The NeW' York 'Iribune affirmed this belief when it wrote that if there
........-

____

n

were no definite peace setUement, it would not be the fault
......

ot

the

president~

I I . It

-

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 De Martens, "World Significance of the Treaty of Portsmouth,"
Ou tlo<?~ LXXXI (November 11, 190,), 603.

5
6

-----

New lor¥; 1ribune, A.ugust

~., August 6,

1905.

4, 1905.
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This newspaper also said, "not a single incident marred the perfect smoothness of the arrangements and their exeeution. n7
Another report said that the plenipotentiaries seemed, by a single
handshake, to be imbued with the Presidentts heartiness.
their faces belied their 88\Y actions).
ference.

(Yet, it added,

8 All women were barred from the con-

There was to be no charm and graoiousness to soothe irritations.

Ever,y possible means was used to seclude the delegates from interferenoe

and oontacts with the outside world.
The first meeting of the envoys took place on August

5, 1905 on

board the presidential yatoh, Mayflower, off Oyster Bay J Long Island.

The

President, not wishing to show favoritism assumed an informal attitude whioh
was considered typical Amerioanism.

In a toast near the beginnirlg of their meeting, Hr. Roosevelt said:
GenUemen I propose a tout to which there 'Will be no
answer and to which I ask you only to drink in silenoe.
I drink to the wlrare and prosperi ty and the sovereigns
and the people of two great nations 'Whose representatives
have met one another on this ship. It is J1J3' earnest hope
and prayer in the interest of not only those two powers,
but of all civilized mankind, that a just and lasting
peace may speedily be ooncluded between them. 9
This statement along with other jestures bears out Bishop's
quotation about the President.

"His conduot during the whole time that the

flU

7

~.

-

8 Ibid.
9 Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and his Times
(new York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 192b), p. 405
--

20

peace negotiatiena lasted has been a marvel of tact ••• HIO
The general opinion was that Japan and Russia would fail to agree

on peace terms.

A message informing all to whom it might concern was

reoeived from Russia stating that Russiats envoy knew of no acceptable basis
nor of a:ny lines approved by both parties upon which a oommon platform might
. 11
be oonstruoted.
Mr. Witte said that he was ooming solely to learn the

.

nature ot the proposals which the Japanese were prepared to make. 12 Rumors
were rampant concerning Mr. Witte's inability to speak tor the Emperor, how-

ever Hr. Witte insisted that he was empowered to arrange peace within 1...·wentyfour hours it the Japanese terms were satisfactory.

Although the opinion of

most writers was that Japan and Russia would fail to agree on peace terms,
it was hoped that the conference would not be a fiasoo.
Baron Xomura submitted in writing twelve Japanese demands August

19, 1905 at the second session ot the conference. lJ
The twelve demands as reported by Hr. Hershey werel

1. The recognition by Russia ot Japants paramount
interests in lorea.
2. An engagement on the part ot Russia to completely
evacuate Manchuria and to relinquish all territorial
advantages in that region whioh tended to impair
Chinese sovereignty or were inconsistent with
prinoiples ot equal opportunity.

-New york Times,

10 Ibid., p. 421 from Outlook, January 1920.

11
12

i.apanese

------

July 18, 1905.

-

Ibid.

13 Amos s. Hershey, Intemational Law and Diplomaol ot the Russo-

!!!:

(New York:

The Maomulan

company-;-l915O),

p.

35i'5. - -

•
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3.

An tmgagement on the part of Japan to restore to China.
all those portions of Manchuria which she occupied"
with the: exclusion of the regions affected by the lease
ot the Lia-tung pennineula.
4. A mutual engagement on the part of Japan and Russia.
not to obstruct al\'r general measures (i.e. common to all
countries) which China my take for the development of
the commerce and industries of Manchuria.
5. Cession ot Skahal1n to Japan.
6. The transfer to Japan of the Russian leases of the Liatung pennisula, including Port Arthur and Talien (~).
7. The transfer to Japan of the Russian portions of the
South Manchurian railroads (together with its branches)
conneoting Harbin with Port Arthur and of all coal mines
appertaining thereto.
8. The retention by Russia of the main lines or latitudinal
section of the central eastern or trans-Manehurian rail-

road; on condition that it be emplo,yed exclusively for
commercial and industrial purposes.

9.. The demand for a war indemnity or rather reimbursement
for the cost of the war. (The amount was not stated but
the cost of the war was variously estimated at from
$500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000.
10. The surrender to Japan of all Russian warships interned
in neutral pcrts during the Vlar.
n. The 11m1tation of Russia's naval force in the Far FAst.
12. The grant of Japanese ellbjects to certain fishing rights
on the Siberian coaat. 14
Russia's reply to these demands was controlled by her precarious
economic military a.nd diplomatic position. lS
Maintaining that she was not a def'ea"t.ed nation, Russia ref'used to
consider certain of these points. 16 Baron Komura. proposed that the articles
be taken one by one to see whether a point of agreement might be reached. 17

-..

-

14 Ibid.
(New York:

JS

Wh:1 tney Grlswold, 1'he Far F..astern POli~ of the United States
Harcourt, Brace and e'ompiiiY, 1§38), p. D - ,

16 E. J. Dillon, "The Story of the Peace Negotiations", Review of

!eviews, LnXVIII (October 1905), p. It.27
17 Hers
p. 351

-

22
Russia "Positively rejeoted the following four danands:
Articles five ten -

the cession of Sakh.al1n, nine -

the indemnity,

the surrender of all Russian warships interned in neutral parts, and

eleven -

llnrl.tation of Russia 1 s naval forces. 18
The Japanese backed down on the last issue since Russia refused to

consider it at all.

The Russian envoys stated that Russia would rather

.

continue the war than yield to these conds.tiona .19
The Japanese delegates had not depended too wholeheartedly upon
articles ten and eleven, therefore, after an interview between Baron Rosen
and Mr. Roosevelt at Oyster Bay, the Japanese withdrew their demand of
articles nine, ten, eleven, and modified article five to have Russia sell the
northern halt of Sakhalin to Russia in consideration of a sum of money. 20
In a personal note to the Czar delivered by Ambassador Meyer, Mr.
Roosevelt urged the Czar to aocept the demands and pointed out the inadvisabili ty of continuing war. 21
A oonfidential note was then sent to Baron Kaneko22 a Japanese

....

......

18 Arthur Judson Brown, The Masteq of the Far East (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919), p. !SO
- - --

19 Hershey, p. 3,4. This sum ot money an amount of 600,000,000
was set by Mr. Roosevelt insists JAr. Dillon. The London Times denied that
it was set by the President.
20

Bishop, p.

406

21 Hershey, p. 354
22 Baron Kaneko was called by newspaper men the financial and
unofficial representative of the Japanese government.

-

2.3
minister residing' in the United states ","i thout portfolio, requesting that he
ask immediate settlement of his government.2.3 Mr. Roosevelt reminded him that
evt'!f!'Y' interest of civilization and humanity forbade the continuance of war for

an indemnity. 24
The representatives remained rigid:

the Japanese representatives

tenaciously holding to their demands and the Russian delegates stubbornly reo

fusing to accept them.
On August 23, 190$, the President again appealed to Japan saying'
Ethically it seems to me that Japan owes a duty to the
world at this crisis. The civilized world looks to her
to made peace; the nations believe in her; let her show
her leadership in matters ethical no less than in matters
mili ta.ry. This appeal is made to her in the name of all
that is lofty and noble and in this appeal I hope she
will not be deaf. 2S
In answer to the President's appeal to Baron Kaneko, Japan expressed
her willingness to make concessions in the amount of indemn1ty asked but re:tused to withdraw the demand for reimbursement of a portion ot the cost of
the war. 26
So grave was the deadlock that followed in the conference that
Baron Komura. in a ldre to Baron Kaneko said that he considered the last hope
•

23 Bishop, p. 406

26
-

24 Ibid.
2; Ibid., p. 407
Ibid., p. 409

24
of peace gone. 27 ...
President Roosevelt had asked Great Bri tian to try to influence
Japan2 8 and Germany to try to influence Russia to accept the peace terms. 29
Baron lemura was not the only one who had lost hope in the progress
of the conference, it was the general belief that Roosevelt had failed. 30 But
on the last session which had been

post~oned

from August 28 to August 29,

1905~

Baron Komura. gave Ms &peror' s consent to withdraw all demands of indemnity
and to divide Sakhalin between Russia and Japan.31

To many of Japan's friends, the results seemed at first sight to
favor Russia, but Japan had secured at Portsmouth all and even more than she

had demanded from. Russia prior to the outbreak of war.)2
The world was shocked and the disappointed of the Japanese populace
showed itself in serious rioting.)) More will be said of the reaction of the
people in these countries in the final chapter of this paper.

The actual signing of the treaty on September "

climax to this important conference.

1905 was an anti-

After the Signing the mtIllbers of the

-

27 Ibid.

28 It was not disclosed until several weeks aftar the Treaty of
Portsmouth had been signed that on August 12, 190" an Offensive and Defensive
Alliance had been concluded between Great Britian and Japan.
29 mshop, p. 409

30 HersheyI p. 3"

--

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
(New York:

33 Ward, A. W. and others, C&mbr1dl5 Modern His!9!2 Volume XII
The Macmillan Company, 191(5)" p. . 1

~ussian

mission 1I'ere scheduled to go to Christ Episcopal Church 1n Portsmouth

IWhere a

.!! ~ service was

Before leaving, Baron Komura vin ted

to be held.

his alma mater, Harvard University.
The actual agreements were made in secret but a "publio rehearsal"

rns held in the presence of the secretaries at which the record was made.

In

this meeting, the Japanese again offered their compromises, met ref'usal, and.

.

finally coneeeded to no indemnity and to the division of Sakhalin.34
The people of the United States cheered President Roosevelt because,
by his actions, the United States had for the first time become a mediator in

a foreign conflict.

There was skepticism about the final results of this

foreign policy and also fear that a new way ot life was being ushered in, but
the average citizen had no further thought than one of pride toward their
leader.

The Japanese too felt that their country' was on the threshold of a

new era.

'fhey wanted the world to become aware of the fact that they had

arrived, therefore, they disapproved of the terms of peace which did not immediately elevate Japan to the position she thought she deserved.

Tokyo

reports in American newspapers stated that the public would eventually accept
the result of the peace conference hcmever disappointing it may have been.3S

'!'he end of the Conference meant rejoicing and congratulations to
President Roosevelt in the United States, rioting by the radicals and general

34 .!!!!2!:!: ...
1'r:t
...........
'bune
.........' September S, 1905.

-

3S Ibid., September 7. 1905.

26
disa.ppointment in--Japan and in Russia the peace terms did nothing to allay the
existing revolutions. 36

-

36 Ibid.

-

...
OBAP'lER III
THE Am'tUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWAIm RU'SSIA AND JAPAN

During the Ruaso-Japanese struggle the United State. t attitude was

of benevolent neutral1ty toward Japan.
I'ITLlIr.LIt'1:!

In the Amerioan press Japaneee

were reoorded with a ttll'Vor lItIh10h could hardly bave been less

....811n feel1.ng."l

'the public as well as President

ROO$EfV'elt

himself thought that the

Japanese cause in 1fa.nc:olhur1a was one with that of all ciT.U1zed powers. 2 Paul
I. Re1nch in an article ent! tled "Japan and Asiatic Leadership" expressed a
1w.»iIL/..foC1W.

belief tbat Japan was fighting "our" battle.

He said that it is a

I_mon belief in Germany and France that England and the Un!ted states are
-.u"u.ug

Japan.' In the same publloation a f_ months later this idea

apressed by Ohester Hol.combe.

ftS

"It is not merely a battle betw'gen Ruesia and

•.,UM.- he insisted, "it is rather a conclusive struggle 'between the powers of
Far East and the ambitious lust and greed of the great powers ot Europe to

1 Foster Rhea Dulles, F~ Years of AlnE!r1cap-J!E!nese
(lew York: D. Appleton-Century Oompa.n;,v;-m1), p .. 10

l!~t1ons,

2 Ibid., p. 67
.......-.:;;:;.7

3 Paul S. Reinch, "Japan and Asiatic Leadership,· Worth .American
Vol. OUXI (Ja.nuary 19Q5l I p. ~7
'
I

21

r
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determine onee end for all the right to existence and the status ot (Japan) •• ~
Japan was looked upon and admired as a courageous, struggling
nation with insufficient man power and supplies to achieve her goal.;
Americans have been known to champion the ftunder-dog. n

American opinion

favored Japan who was apparently fighting to check an imperial Pan-Slavism
wrote Vr. Reinch in the Political Scieqoe guarterll;. 6 An attempt to explain

-

this pro-Japanese feeling was made in an editorial in the New York '1':im.e8. 7

'.l'his article said that the sympathy extended to Japan in their struggle with
Russia was in a very high degree a moral issue.

The American public disliked

Russia's want ot good faith in not keeping her word in evacuating Manchuria.
We approved and admired

the frc:.nkness ot Japanese in setting forth the

objectives tor which they went to war. Objectives which our sense of right
accepted as justU1ab1e and sufficient.

Japan, a nation whose

was threatened, was taking measure,. ot selt-defense.

VeFy

aistence

Japan's pledge to main-

tain the "open door" was supposedl7 another outward sign that Japan' 8 c&uas

was one with western interests. 8
'fhat the Japanese were aware ot sentimental feeling toward the
td

4

Chester Holcombe, "Some Results

Uont!9:Z, XCVI (Jul¥ 190$), p.. 30

ot the

Eastern War" I Atlantic

; Raymond L. Buell, "Development ot Anti-Japanese Agit&t1on",
Political Science ~rterl:l, Vol .. XXXVII (December 1922), p. 614

6 Paul S. hinch, p. ;7
7

!!! ~ 'Hmes,

-

8 Ibid ..

May

3, 1905.
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Un! ted States ant1 also shared tbis sentiment is evident f'rom the two following
quotations from Japanese sources:

"America from the beginning to the end, has

made no secret ot her sympathy tor our land." 9 Another Japanese publication
the T!5lo referred to American sympathy toward their cause.

It stated:

America is the home of the open door policy and of the
maintenance of' the integrity of China, and tor these
great principles Nippon bas talcen up arms against Russia.
America has shared ever:! effOrt to open Jl&nehuria to the
world's commerce band-in-band with Nippon. Her c01'l!llercial
treaties with China were signed at the same t.1.me as ours.
It would be d.1.tt1clut for America to keep herself from
showing sympathy with our cause. We are told that the
public sentiment of America is completely on the side of
Htppon.10
In a protest against the -yellow perll" threat an ed:i torial in the
New York fimes
-

upheld Japan by stating that talk about a ",.allow peril" is

vain and ill-conoeived unless there be a peril in treating 78llmr races ae
fellow men, with humanity and justioe. ll The threat ot danger, aa antiJapanese SO'l.l:rCes argued, lay in permitting Japan to make her own peace.

If

she had her way in mald.ng peace, they feared she would aspire to rise againat
the white

1"&C8,

destroy caucasian prestige in China and India, and eventually

overwhelm the white race. 12 Bttll lnslst.i.ng that there was no "yellow p&1"1l1t I

9 Edwin ~, "Wh;r We Favor Japan in the Present War", Arena
Vol. XXXII (August 19(4), p .. 131

-

10 Ib1d.

n

Wew York Times,
........
.F July 26, 190$
~

-

12 Ibid.

r
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the New York '.rimes stated that Japan gave not the slightest indication of

--

undue pride, arrogance or antagonism against the Western world. 13

Edwin :Maxey in an article previously quoted. attempted to explain
the underlying causes of American sjInlpathy for Japan.

He ennumerated the

cause for this sentiment toward J apanJ yet, he said it was inconsistent with

our past friendship toward Russia. 14 ~re was a natural sympathy to the
weaker opponent; .America had given Japan her first look at Western civilisation and bad influenced that country to the extent that the Japanese bad

become the "Yankee of the East.ttlS Also American trade in the Paeutc could
not be overlooked, therefore, she must depend upon Japan.. Japan could not
af'ford to abandon the ()pen door, thought Edwin JIaxey because by doing sO she
would allienate herself b-om her best Mends -

England and the United

Statee.1.6 fhis writer, giving a. typical example of Japanese eenti.ment,
continued sa;ving t'bat Russia stood for reaotion-the triumph ot absolutism
OVer the rights of the incH.vidual, this was the anti thesis of pJ'epees tor

which Japan stood. 1 ?

'this is a sample ot but one ot maltf articles showing

outward favor ot the Japanese cause ..
11'

t

....

1

-

13 Ibid.

14
15

Maxey. p.

-

Ibid.

16 Ibid.

-

11 Ibid.
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Count eass1.ni tried to reSU1"rect American-Russian tri.endsh1p by
recalling the visit ot the Russian fleet in American waters at the time of
He expressed surprise at our 1ngratitude. 18 Wharton Baker,

the OiVil War.

presidential nominee agreed with the above statement and pointed out further
reasons for championing the Russian cause, as also did Colgate Baker in

Ind!Eendenc~ .sasine. 19
A Russian publlcation accused the A.meri.cana of precipitating the

war. !zeetn1k!!"?pz ot St. Petersburg said that the Japanese without the
American press would never have involved themselves so deeply in the struggle

with Russia and might have. sought an understanding rather than open oonfl1ot.20

.!2!! V!"!\t!

also of St. Petersburg said the tJn1 ted statea Id.med to make China

an industrial center ruled by Americans in the torm ot trusts. 21 Port Arthur's

!!!Z !!:2! said that

Japan was not the real opponent, the un:tted States had

made Japan ita pawn in carrying out Roosevelt's plan that the Pacific Ocean
w:l th all of 1.ts islands and coasts were the proper sphere of American

domination. 22
Russia, of course, objected to outward triend.ehip shown by America
toward Japan.

Part ot Russia t S obj action pointed to racial and religiOWlJ

... ,*

•

18 Dulles,!!!.!. ~12 Teheran, p. 89
19 Wharton Bak~1 "The Secret ot Russia I s Friendship", Ind!pendence
LVI (lfarch 17" 19(4), p. 049. Colgate Baker, "The Real Japanese aSracteiJi,
Independence, LVI (March 17, 19(4) , p. 6b4.
20 "Russian Opinion of American Meddling in the Far East", Review
nIX (April 19(5), p. 166.

.!! ~eviewa,

21 Dulles, The ~!2 'teheran, p. 89-90
22 Ibid.

-

r
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differences.

'lbey protested

that wt.d.te men should stand together against

yellow and Christians against heathens. 23 '!he following report from the

-

!!!

York Times and other similar reports added to the Amer1can people's distrust
of Russia.

The headlines read:

ftJauntily Russia Gives

Up

Port Arthur." !be

article pOinted out contrasts in character between the defeated Russians and
the Japanese "rlctors. 24 It said, "'the ,demeanor of the Japanese officers 'AS

all that should be desired) they were politeness itself} and to see them'

helping the Russians to sort their luggagel 2S !he article continued saying
that Russia receiTed this assistance contemptuously.

'the onlookers had

sympathy for the Russians until they beheld their costumes "tit for a ball
rather than the finale of a tragedy," and until the soldiers pushed the

tt'l'he:r treat

wanen aside leaving them to await the next slow mO"fing train. 26

their women like so tIIoI.l'lY beaste. 1f27 It can be readily imagined what affect
this article had on the American housewife.

Deepi te pleas tor American friendship, the feeling in the tJnited

States seemed to be that Russian autocracy was farther renoved .fl!o<a the spirit
ot western Europe and the United States than were the Japanese. 28

23 Dean Howells, "The Peacemakers of Portsmouth", !!:!:per t s Wee!l:z,
Vol. XLIX (August 20, 190;). p. 1244.

24 !!! ~

Times, April

1, 1905.

--

2; Ib1d.
26 Ibid.
27

Ibl<\_

28 'Arthur Judson Brown, !n! ..~
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919) I p. 192.

.2!.!!!2!!!. East,

(New York:
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It was "nOt Russia.'s propaganda that turned America from Japan.

It

was Japan herself and Japanese victories which caused enthusiasm. toward Japan

to wane. 29 Regarding waning favoritism toward Japan, an ed1toria1in the !!!

-

York Times stated that Americans must still believe that Japan had the· better
.

cause, but, it ea1d, when time for sentiment is past and consideration ot

self-interest again possesses the
beneficial to hi_elf.

m1nd~

one favors that 'Which will prove

Although Russia may have menaced our shippingS and

Japan may keep the open door, the American shippers would not be able to
compete with Japan' IS cheaper goods and she would undersell the Un!ted States
and possess the markets. 30

As Japan began to show signs of victory -

even while the newspaper

battle previously mentioned with Russia was being waged toward Russia became widespread.

a shitt in opinion

Americans were becoming suspicious of

Japanese objectives.)!

The Amer1can public _s warned against the tendency to idolize
everything Japanese. 32 Some ot the questions that arose in the public's
mind were:

would Japan olese the open doer? Would she respect American

interests in Ohina it she were the ruling foroe in l.fanchu:ri.a?
p

Il

,.

29 Paul S. Reinsch, p. $7
30

!!!!2!:!1 t.t:iae,.

April 1,

1905.

31 Dulles, Road to 'teheran, p. 90

-

'l(.,vJ\S TOW€"~

32 Ibid ..
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Mr.. 'Dul!!l.es expressed the feeling

ot most Americans at the time not

as ftbeginning to love Russia more" but the trend was to "love Japan less. ,,33
A nEJltf cause for anti-Japanese sentiment arose during the peace negotiations,
it was the outward attempt to .nay American opinion toward friendship to
'fhree influencing factors which contrtbuted to the switch in

Russia.

sentiment from Japan to Russia were:
Russia to the Alner1can public.

1. the activities of Mr. Witte to ·sell"

.

2. the threat to the United States t Pacific

3. the distrust of Japan created by the Japanese delegate. at

possessions.

the peace conference.
Mr. Witte, the Russian representatives at the peace oonference

obv:l.ously tried to ".ell· himself and the Russian cause. !he Japall$8e en'Voya,
on the other hand, gave the public the impression ot being selt-asaured and
arrogant.

The!!!

~ _~
•.,;;;.;;e_s

eaid that JIr .. Witte "worked the newspapers 11ke

an imperial press agent.· 3h !be newspaper even implied that JIr. Witte went

too tar in his atteq:>t to sway- the American public} "Control and more formal
publici tytt J it said, "would bave been the better policy 41" "
In contrast to the outward signs of the Russians to attain the good
will of the American public I the Ob1cyo Mb1Jne36 quoted a Japanese source
ItII

n,.'

r.t.

jj

-

33 Ibid.

3h .!!!!2!:! 1'ime6,

-

35 Ib1.d.

August

S, 1905.

r
stating their op1nion of public1t7 seeking.

The article saidl

We do not seek to obtain public sympathy b.Y such methods.
American triendship, it it is sincere, a.s we believe it
is, will not be overturned by the tact that Japan a.!'ter
solemn compact entered into 1m" with Ruesta, refuses) in
pursuance of allintern&tional precedent, to make public
the negotiations now in progress. When sane a.r.rangElllJSl'lt
shall bave been arriTed at, so tar trom losing Mendship
in 1tb1s country, we believe the Japanese plenipoteDt:tar1es
will growby' the stolid 1I'l\T ~ wbichwe tollbw' this oourse. 37
The

!!! ~ ....Time
............
s said that

strict adherence was not paid to the

poliey- of secrecy, and that it may be that they bave received peace which

might not baTe been obtained if' their policy has been .fUl.tilled.38

Man:r statements which manifest waning confidence in Japan expressed
tear tbat Japanese nctories would breed a spirit ot "self-canciet which will
lead her to think that she can conquer the 1IOrld. "39

"mew while

I do not giva credenca to this", .sa1.d Ur. Roosevelt

regarding the affect which Japanese victories might have on tbe Paci.tic,· •••
I must recognise that it bas some force. MhO
Jf.r. Hull as chairman ot the House Committee of Jlil1tary Af'ta:tre

declared that it Japan won the war with Russia, she would fight a bloody war
with the United States aver the Phillpp1nes. 41 Regarding this rising tear of

41 Polittcal Science guarter;lz, Karch 16, 1905, quoted from the
GOiitcXe.···

San Francisco

36
Japan, the Political Science

~

quoted the Ogden St.andard which said

that the Ja.panese feel quite contident ot their ability to deteat the American

navy and humilia.te our ar.my.b2
In a letter to J. A. Hull, President Roosevelt wrote:
It may be that the Japanese have designs on the Philippines ..
I hope not ••• but I believe we should put our naval and
mill tary preparations in sucP . shape that we can hold the
Philippines against aDiY toe.lt3

Hr. Roosevelt aleo wrote, spealdng of the "formidable new power" ..
Japan.. "It 1rr:1'bated she could at once take both the Philippines and the
Hawaiian Islands from us if she obtained the upper hand in the sea. ft44 Ma.uT
.Amerlcans teared that Japan had 1 ts e,ree on the Philippines.

'lbe ed.1tor

Kohumin Shimbien stated that this change of attitude in the United States was
due to the blWlder of a London printer who, in printing a war map.. made the
Philippines the same color as that representing Japan.4$' Tokutom1 11chiro
added, lilt Nippon were so wild and foolish as to take that nightmare in the

southern seas (the Philippines) ott the bands of America, she might be
pardoned to suppose that Nippon ought to
....

I

j

l!"ebaive

a world or two of than.1cs from

...

-

43 Ib1d.

h4 Ibid.
16 ftJapan on, the American Attitude", Review
Ifay

1904, p. )19.

.!?! Reviewa,

Vol.

mx
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the American press. lt 46 J1r. Blakeslee thouglrt that cause for the change in the

publicls regard tor Japan was due to Russian diplom.acy.47 He wrote:
The Russian diplomacy was particularly successf'ul in so
pleading i is case to the American goverment, through its
chief executive, and the American public, through the
press J as to arouse the vague but none the less disquieting
fear that Japan might one day occupy both Russia and the
Chinese coast ot the Asiatic Pacific and next descend. upon
the Philippines, Guam, Haw1~, and finally upon the Pacific
slope of this continent.48

the peace
Japan.

terms were another cause for the cooling attitude toward

The public did not trust Japanese secrecy and suspected that Baron

Kaneko was acting contrary to the Japanese claim of secrecy in negotiations.

'the:r also distrouated his via1ts With Mr • Roosevelt which

were supposedly

purely personal in nature.
Japan bad received all that she had sought, if the war was actually
fought to keep Russia out of Southern Manchuria and Korea.

In addi Uon.

Japan obtained Daln;y, Port Artb:ul", Ohinese Eastern Railroad, and. Southern
Sagbalien which is rich in coal, iron ore, oil, fisheries, and is situated
advantageously in a controlling position of the La Percuse Strait and the
Japanese Sea.

In contrast to Roosevelt's former spirit, he remarked to

Senator Oabot Lodge in June of 1905J "Japan now has Port Arthur, Korea, and
., t

,

r

-o.

46 lb1d.
York:

H. Bl.akeelee. Jn~ !a! JaE!!!!$~ .Amer1~ Jtelatiol¥J., (Nert
Stechert and Compe.lV'" 1
•

47

-

48 Ibid., p. 230

the domianee in tfanchuria.

I f'eel that the less she asks f'ar in addition,

the better it would be. 49 Many shared. the ,Nation's opinion that the Ja.panese

claim for an indemnity was u.nwarranted.)o
1'he printing of tour thousand N.ve hundred copies of' "Report on
Japa.nese Naval Medical and Sa..'1itary Features of the Busso-.Ta.panese War"
indicated somewhat of' a kingly att.1. tud~ toward the Japanese. 51 Seereta.r.Y

Root advised Ambassador

Meyer

Japanese goverl'lllent and

its

to continue friendly offices in behalf' of the

subj eets.

The fitty-ninth Congress praised. ltooaevel.t

cerned more with results.

tS

work but were con-

ttlt halt that is told of Japanese intentions a.s to

merchant marine 1s true, then an activity lVi11 issue on the Pa.cific Ocean
which 1'1111 astonish the world. "S2

In the tina1 analysis both of' the belligerents were seeking their

-_

own interests. The NSfI' York .................
Times said that both combatants 'Were on tz:1al
and that the actuating motive of Japan and Russia

'Vi'aS

substantially 1denti...

cal.Sl !he article placed little con:f'1denee in the conference when it said
that who ever was victorious, the United States would be the looser. S4
liII

49 Dennett,

p. 16$

;0 Nation, Vol. LlXII (August 24, 19Q5), p. 153

n

1'1.. PrestonL "Fa.ir Play for Japan" I ;tt1:vins ~ Vol. COLIX
(October 17, 1908), p. 100.

S2 "Exclusion of Japan from Vladivostockff , House Document No.

(59th Congress 11th Seasion, 19(5), p. 29.

53 !.!!!2!:! T1m~s,
S4

-

Ibid.

August

14, 1905.

-

ak

r
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In general, the nation favored the peace terms.
~!!i!!eld

The Midwestern

R!publ1can considered the moral aspects of the terms) It saidl

"Russia. has saved 1ts kopecks and Japan bas lost,. but 1fhos$ is the moral
prestige and advantage for the gain and 10asD ? It went on to say

It ...

'Ion the

tace ot things 1t 1s certain that Russia succeeded 1n presenting to Japan the
moral victory and that this opportunity ot winning the moral victory bad been

.

seised in the possible view that it may be worth more than the material

Sentiment in the West was not so clear cut.

'Victory .. "

A feeling ot distrust

had become evident even at this time, but all were not in agretDent against

Japan on the Pacitic

ooast.,6

Although the American public generall7 favored Japanta yielding and

although the public was satisfied with the treaty, Japan never again regained

its status in the sentiment ot the American public ..
'l'bings had gone as they did because Japan had, by the terms or the

Portsmouth Treaty, thrown ott the European balance of power.

Therefore,

Nippon became the center of the world's diplomatic activities.'1
The Japanese felt that they had been victorious and thought that

the7 were entitled to their peace demands especially allot Sagbalj.en
'Ii

,

,.

SS W.. E. Gr.ttf'ia, "llhy Russia and Japan Should Shake
Outlook,
Vol
txn (Augtl$t 1905) .. p. 963 •
• r

,6

and an

-

Bands",

Ibid.

S7 Count O'Kuma,

(August 2), 19Q5), p.

U32.

"Diplomacy and the War," Ind!pendent, LII

40
indemnity to cover the cost ot

war.58

Upon hearing the unofficial announce-

ment of peace, riots broke out in the Tokyo streets. 59 These riots were a
form of protest against the peace terms and against the United states, the
scene of the peace negotiations.

This situation probably developedbeeause

the Japanese people were not in a pOSition

to

know the dangerous losses

involved. in continuing the war. 60 The. violence in Tokyo and the discontent
in st. Petersburg, were only that which might have been expected. 61

••••

t1

dt

S8 Arthur Judson BroIm, p.. 192. .

S9 '1'heodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt, (Wew York, Charles

Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 586.

-

60 Ibid ..

-

61 Ibid.
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CHAP'tER IV
RESULTS OF THE PORTSIDU'l'H CONFERENCE

In this chapter an

at~t

will be made to state the ertecte ot the

oonference upon the minds of the people of the United States and inoidentally"
the ef:f'eets of the conference a.s shown by reactions in Russia and in Japan.
In Chapter II, the terms of the conference were outlined.

The conference had

not been a :f'iasco sinoe the immediate aim was the cession of hostilities.
Rev1n1ng the final day 01' the conference" we find Witte with a
oabled ultimatum trom the Czar which read:

oonterenee.

"'I'o::tlOr1"OW must be the last

I prefer war to humiliating concessions to Japan. h1

lfr. Witte told the Japanese envoys what the cable had said and.
added=

"Russia will not pay indemnity in 3.rtr torm. We will agree to divlde

Sakhalin Island.

That is the last word of my emperOl".,,2

'1'0 this Baron Komura replied:

""!'hat proposal is not acceptable.

!ut we will waive the indemnity and keep Sakhalin.ttl When Mr. Witte responded

that Russia. wo-uld cede only one half of this island, the startling answer by

1 Cbies-fa0 DailZ; Tribune, August 30, 1905.

-

2 Ibid.

-

:; Ibid.

r

Baron Kanurtu

""e agree", caused a great silence to fall over the conference

room. 4
The war bad ended, but. as is the case in most

represented a major mental and diplomatic battJ.e.

The

1ALrS,

the peace terms

results of the

conf'erence were yet to be seen. Neither side had yielded and neither was
wholeheartedly pleased with the outeomfll ot the events.. Rejoicing fol.lowing

the negotiations as the Amerioan reaction. !his feeling was not shared by
the parties concerned -

c1 tizens ot Russia and Japan.

'!'he Ohicago

~bune

stated that -no one was satisfied except Roosevelt. u$

!he end of the war was a great boon to Europe.

end of the war tor her own sake.

Europe welcomed the

Except in otf'ioial circles and in St.

Petersburg and Berlin, the MWS that the peace will. be made

win

be received

throughout Europe wit.h unbonded satisfaction and rejOicing.6 It ie 1d.t.h a
sensation ot intense relief that France rejoioes.

In Europe aDd America the

success of the Portsmouth Conf'erenoe was the theme of conversation in clubs,
cafes, and on the street.

!he European countries were afraid lest the tension

which bad reached a head in the torm of a Russo-Japanese War in the East, might
spread tbrougbout Europe..

Japan or Russia.

-

.... Ibtd.

S
6

Ibid.

Ibid.

lfany countries had indirectly sided with either

The Moroccan Crisis again bad become serious and the tact

that Russia now"ould be able to place a large force on her 1'fe8tern frontier
ade the outlook for future developments brighter. 7 Word regarding the end
of the war and also

tu

Offensive and Defensive AUiame between England and

Japan removed the threat of the

ltV

spreading in the West. 8

!he cause of Japan t s u.nexpeeted vd. thdrawal of her demand tor an

indemnity was attributed to the pressure plaeed upon Japan by" Great Britian,

.

but

that this was the iDmediate cause for tbe sudden

tions was denied.

!he Chicago Tribune said that it

end of peaoe negotia-

was untrue also.'

Although England earneet1y desired peace principally beoause

erial. in order to curb the

(ai.Etr'S

or the

European

adventurous ap1r1t, Japan would not

saeritice her own interests in this 1I'ay.1O
Let \'II now turn to the reaction to the end of the conference in

Russia.

Otficiall:1, Russia _e.orry the war ended.. U

!here was not

80

DlOh rejoicing in Russi,. as 111 America on the IlOI"nlng after the news .....

received in st. PetersbUrg. A report said that there was little difference

on the streets of that cttl', fa nags fl_ and no one, except the newsb07s,
,

at

-

7 Ibid.
8

:Ibid.

9 Ibid.
10 lbid.

n

Ibid.

bh
WEtre

anxious to

the opinion ot

4I1sCUS8

~

the matter. 12 A lussian soldier 18 quoted as voicing

when he 88.id

m1ght have done better.

that the war should have gone on alld Russia

"!he strategic pos1tion", he thought, . . . more

favorable than it had been the previous YelU".ftlJ

'.f'he v1ctary 1n Japan stimulated a n.. IPirlt throughout Asia.

Ft#

the first time in tour hundred and fifty years an Asiatic parer had defeated

and turned

back a European fwoe. lh

.

This reaction came after much reflection,

81me the immediate 1'eaction in Japan

ftS

marked vdth riots and mass meet-

inp .. l$ five chr:t.stiAn ohurcbea (tour of them Amer1oan) were damaged or

destroyed by the rioters. Jfartial law and str.Lot press Ngulati<m8 had to be
established which lasted until Icv'ember 29, 190>.16

ot riota

m

feeling in

the form

and protests were 11'1 tneesed mostly in the larger 01ties of 1*olqo,

lobe, and Yokohama. 17 the 'fikado _s pet1t1oned to refuse to sign the treat,.
aDd oontinue the war. 18 !hare were also danands
t

that the m1n:1etr'.r relign,

"

1905),

12 O. ".'Wright, "Russia After the Warft , l'ation LmI (October 12,
p.

29S.

-

13 Ibid.
P&18On J. Treat, The !!t East. a Political. and Diplomatic
~ (N.. Yorlct Harper's·~ l3U'1)l1ebIng a~,'"'DlB'J p. !6J.

1h

15 Pa1Bon J. !reat, Diplomatic Relatione Between the tm1ted States
(Stanford, -eaU::rornIa, i!J'GiitOi'a ttiitverirtj Press,'

and 4!p!n, Ut2S-~.
D~8), p. 2pr:-"'

16

-

Ibid. J p.

-

17 Ibid.

249.

r
and offices of newspapers that had supported the govarmnent were wrecked
reported Arthur J.. Brown.l9 Speoial precautions were taken to protect the

American legation located between .. pOlice station and Marquis Ito
residence. 20 the newspapers were

satisfactory and

lmmil~at1ng

Ullan!moUS

in declaring the terms

t.

1lJ')oo

and the end of the 'war a "disgraceful surrender!J

.

OOUl't circles 'Were intensely d18gusted with the peace

terma. 22 Mr. Griscom

in Japan 'WrOte to Mr. Roosevelt testitying the tact that the terms were iU-

received in Japan. Mr.

Ol'iSOOJI

wrote:

.A large .ection of the press demanded and oonf'1dent1allT e»peeted the cession of t11att1vostok and the Russian sr1tine
provinces, as wen as the island of Sagbal1en, and the payment of a tbo1.18llld million dollars indemn11i7.. Even the more
reasonable conservative clueea apected the ceo_slon of

Bagbalien-- It mal" be ~ said that outside t.he
~t, nobcKb" in the l!mpire espacted that Japan wcmld
be obliged. to accept the te1'ms wb1ch it is now lIDderst004
~ oontained in the treaty of peace.!)

!he conference marked the beginning of a new at.titude ton.rd Japan

in the Untted States. 'This attitude us partly due to a deliberate pollcy
of Witte to Yin the good will of the American people.

Rls aem.o1rs tell how

he set about doing this and SIlOceed.ed. 2h Witte said, " ••• the press in its

-

19 Ibid.
20 !reat,

-

DiE-

~ti~ns Between tTnf.ted Stat~

!!!! Jaen,

p.

21 N.d ..
22 Cld._1!

P!!k Tribune.

2, Treat, D1;elomatio Relations
Jaee, p. 2b.B.

24 treat,!!!!.!!£

!!ft.

1905.
Between !!!! United States !!l4

August 31,

p. 38).

248.

turn

_8

lnstrumeltal in bringing about a complete. change in publio opinion

of the country in ,favor of IIU person and the cause I upheld. a2S !he end of
the

ttar

also caused a marked change in the public on both sides of the Paci.f1c

Japan thought Roosevelt responsible tor thetr 1088 of indemnity.

fheAmer1can

people SUSpected the foreign policy of Japan and were aroused over the

Japanese 1nttgratlon problem..

Americans. were alarmed by military success and

tv interJ3al changes within Japan 1Ibichabolisbed the Shogunate and built

up

military leaders inetead of ci'V'il1ane. This situation caused more and more
cCIIIIIlent in the

tIm.ted States

88

facts became k:nown. 26 At.f'1rst because of

the great distance betwtlen Japan and the United Statea, the American people
paid little attention

aggressive poliey.

to interDal

Japanese af'f"a1r8

(11'

l'llDlO'n

et

J'apaneae

!his foreign policy had a slow growth but ita co.tant

:reiteration 1n the Am.erican press could not tail to influence public opinion.!':
When the treaty was aignedl sudden change in attitude toward Japan deYeloped
and some papers OPenl7 doubted the ldsdcm. of hav:tng a atrong and independettt

Japan in As!a .. 26 !hen arose fantastic tales of both nations. In Oanada the
"

~

•

n

2S

-

Ibid.

26 PEq8011 J. f.teat, la
and the United States ~lnl,
(Stanford, Oalifornia: stantOd ~versil7"PreS81 l~rn, p~'.

-

E

27 Ib1d., p. 187.
26 ~etation!! American Foreie: Po11&, Harris Foundation
Lectures, p.
•

h7
people "ere told"to ff!JllJr Japanese invasion of British Columbia.. Franee .....
alerted against possible attack on Indo-China, sites

ot attack in South

American, 'Mex1co, and the Pacific coast were pointed up.29 JIr. Pelicien

Cballqe in .,Rewe
..........., S!. Paris was one of few who held that European1ut1on bad

not changed the Japanese. 30 lIa.ny writers shared Colgate Baker's opinion

that the Japanese" .... (the,y) seEmed to ,accept western civilization but the7
have accepted merely' its mechanism and not its ideas.

They are playing a

part, the better to carr:! out the s~ of their
Arthur Jttcnm quoted other SOUl"Ces

ot

CMn

nation.·.3l

distrust of Japan printed after the

war.

One source said that either Japan or the UD1ted States must recede from its

position. Japan's friendliness toward the United States, it Said, exists
onLy in the meaningless conventional phrase

or

diplomatic usage in the

propoganda of Japanese stateamen and American peace-a~ce advocates •.32
Some reports R1'D.ed against Japanese troops in the Philippines 1'1'UIILbe.rinc

55,000 when in

reality there were Oliq 8,000 Japanese inhabitants there."

American missionaries in Japan tried to patch up miS1.Ulde:rstandings

to interpret Japanese actions. lIr. Brown suggested that

by attemption
I

I

•

l

29 Treat, JaE!!'!!!!!

-

Urdted states Relat1.ons,p •. 188.

)0 "Is Japan1s Progress Changing Japanese Cbaracter"?

Work (JIay 19Oh), p. &726.

,2 -

)1 Ibid.

B.ttown, p.. h08.

"

Ibid., p. 401.

r
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Americans ward drf possible difficulties b7 retu1ng to countenance some of

the J'eports that .....e eurrent.34
Elilm ltoot, who succeeded Ha.7 as Secretar7 or state cODnented that
during all that period there !leY" w.s a moment when the gove.mment of Japan

was not frank, 81nc..e and. t:riendl7, and most 8011ci tollS not to enlarge b\tt
to Idnimiae and do - 7 witil all oa~

ot ccm.trov...,-.3S !here 1II'8're

1Who tftIJre still kindly disposed to Japan )"8t the sentiment was

80

those

great in the

oppoa1te direction that senftl wartlings had been issued. in the foreign

dispatches that the United States press should. suppress feelings and atreat a

neutral.1ty which th.,-

may'

not have felt in order to keep 1ts 1ntl'tl.f.m8e in tbe

two countries.36
The

1I'U'

bad ended.

the reason for its erJd 1I'a8 not obI'lous. .. ..

1811ard advanced the idea that the

cause

a_s:1a

and Japan telt

war

may have been br aJght to a close "be-

that the world was bec<md.128 un...,. about their

continued occupation of lIanc!mr1a and they - f bave thought it wise to

M terate allegiance to the open door and the terr1tor1al 1n'tegrit7 of Oh1nJ. 7

JIa%V' doubted whether Japan reallT expected to obtain 'What she
I

r

I

1

••

-

.35 Ibid.,
.36

(JIq

1904',

p.

p.

hlo.

"Good l(anners

4725.

taward Japan and Russia" I World'.

37 !homaa Villard, Am.er1ca !!'!! the
JIoft'at Yard and OQ1llpan;y, 19(9), p" 280.

!2r.!.ml

!!!: ?astern QBestion

(lew York:

49
actually did.3S" A. Stead thought Japants action of yielding was a mark of
shrewd statesmansh:lp .39 1Ib11e others thought the 'Wi tbdrawal ot cJ.a1ms ot
1ndelmity not an act of statesmanship, but a necessity sinee contirm1ng the
contlict .,uld bave made it appear that Japan launched the war tor money.
Jlal'l7 felt that both had gained and both had lost and it was also

bel1eved tbat ne1ther had forced to

ac~t

humil1at1.ng

terms.

generallJr

lfany

atters

were lett to be adjusted later,40 and there even existed the tear that war
might break out apin between Russia and Japan even atter the peace. 1tl

1\1 Roosevelt's 8Ugpst1on to limeko that Japan 'Withdraw the indemnity issue, the United States waa involYed more in the actual peace
maldng, since this item represented the most :tmporta:nt clauSe in the peace

treaty and since this was the issue that almost caused a stalemate in the

coDference proceedinp. Ja In an article ent1tled "!be Menace ot Japanese
Success., the author regretted the tact that this count1:'y had al.1gned itself
with Japan rather tbanwith

a._1& because,

he thought by aiding nth Japan

the United States could take the initSati'¥'e in the development of the

38 !rcnm,

p.

187.

39 A. stead, "The Peace and After" I Rmewof Rev1_ DXII
(Nonmber 19Q5), p. ~99.
-

ho J6.lla.rd, p_ 280.

bl I. H. HiaImond, ItKeDace of Japanese Success", World's Work X
(June, 19Q5), p. 627.
'
b2 E. J .. DUlon, "The ~ of Peace Negotiations" I Co~arz
Review; LDl.'VIU (Octobel' 1905), p. 474.

~~-----

so
resources of 16ant:huria, !orea, and Ch1na. ls3
Whatever the tuture outcome of the conference, the acclaim received
by'Mr. Roosevelt fol.lowing

the conference was tremendous. Ocmnentar1es on

President Roosevelt.s participation in the negotiations reflect the teelings
of the people regarding the settlement as well. President RooseTelt was
compared 'to '1'1ber1us Gracchus because

O. S. Dana in Review

o!

h18 eftort. to bring about peace by

.2! Rm!!,!. 44

lloosevelt like Q:racchus is a man of rare boldness and
undoubted courage. Be 18 alao energetic, awesaive,
persistent, and determined. Hia honest", 11ke that of
f.tberius.. 18 the '.l"IlUed sort that J.cnmrs no taint of
l!JUS.Picion iu1E! permits no caapraJdee with laggards and

mldoera.16

other comments saidt

!he American president f S auspicious act baa taken a
high and ~nt place in the bistol7 of human ....

deavor.40

!he President J b7' bis wel.l.-meant efforts to establ1eh
peace has merited well tor humanity and made a noble
use of his e:mlted position and far-reaching influence.
, .. he bas created a wholesome precedent which wen
though 1t cannot be fol.lowed by' and but exceptional.l.7
~ l~s of men, is none the less a welOG1D8

11'11'Jt1Vation.41

•

4

43 I. H., Hammond, Itltenace of Japanese Success," p. 6274.

hh

C. S. Dana, Review

16
46

~.

.2! l\eviews

XIX! (llarch 1905), p. 3"5.

-The POl'tamouth Oonference," Outlook LUX (A:agust 17, 19(5).

1&7 E. J. D1llon, "!be World's Peacemakers," C~or!!7l Review
LlXXVln (SeptEmber 1~), p. )al.

r

$1
And in

ttte:rerz m.eet
In spite 01 the risk that wa.s taken in involving the
11Rlted l'bates in an ,entaDg1.1ng all1ance f IIi8n7 American
papers whoae pollc1.as are opposed to the p~,ident admit
he took the proper COUl"Se on this oceasion.48

!he Record Herud claimed;

!he part played by the pres1dent in the negotiations baa
been the occasion of editorials enough to till all of
Ol.lt" pages. Without regard to party or sect1on. the papers
praise him far his skill and tact in holding fihe conference
.together until an agreement could be reached.",

!here were but fa dissenting notes.

If!:!'P!r t s

"e!¥!lAidt

!he president has the personal :renown of haVing 1.lrought
about the conference, but too little is known ot the
circumstances of bis intervention. He will be lauded
by the multitudes for ha'Ving ass1.ted in 'brealdng the
deadlock, but he entered upon th1s delicate task in a
anner to impugn his part1ality and w1th a scheme wtJich
bad no cbance of acceptance. On this it is not necessary to dwell 11011'. The rejoic1ng of the hour 18, that
~ slaughter bas been averted, and that tile old
world bas composed its ditf'erences in the new.50

President Roosevelt besides congratulating the delegates theYJl8elvee

sent his thanks to the laiser 1Ih1ch said:
I thank 10U moet heartily tor your congratulations and
wish to take this opportUDity to apr..s 'Iff'3" profound
appreciation of the way you cooperated at tWfIl!7 stage in

-

48 tt!erms ot Peace," Uteraa R!leet

49' ttpeace as the

m

(September 9,

190», p. 33

Amer1can F4itors See It," Public 9R!ni.on xnII

(September 9, 190$'), p. 337.
~O

E. J. Dillon, "Peaee COltterence at Portsmouth, If_ Hampshire, U
1~) I p. 1224.

!!!'Perts We!!9Z XLIX (August 26,

tho Irfon to bring about peace in the Orient. It hu
been 'Very' pleasant to ~k with ;you tow'ard tlds end.,l
Another

COl!!!lent

whioh hints of a euspicion of ltooseveltt a moU ves in seeld.ng

peace i8 a comment _de in a letter to the ed:itor of Wation.

ltoosevelt as peacemaker was not averse to war. Be intert.ed because he teared that Japan would tu:rtbs.r humiliate
Ru8sia and would become too pmrerful 1n1he East to e:u1t
the comtort and convenience of the :lmraders of the Orient
from the West. 52
.
!he aarding of the Nobel Peace prize to Preaident Roosevelt is a

mu.ch truer 1r.dex of the feeling of the general public toward the pt'e8ident
fot!

the part he plqed in the Portsmouth Conference.
ftle Treaty ot Portsmouth bad baen signed and the

W8:'

ended"

Japatlts only temporary set baek 'b7 the outcome soon began to re-establish
herself in her new role of dominance of the Pacific.

Russia, strangled

by 1nteI"nal. aff'a.1re was rele1'Ved by the cecession of hostilities and con-

centrated on mending

hap

internal affairs.

The United. Stat_ having gained a higher statue in the world's
qeI by

her role as mediator between two war1ng countries now had two parte

to pl..q-one of maintaining he%" position in t.b.e Pacific and quieting anti-

Japanese sentiment particularly on the western coast of this courrt,ry.

'this ;rear marks the fort,..siXth anm:versa:ry of the Signing of the
Portsmouth Treaty. !he newspapers ahow a reversion in public optnion-

..

n !!! York 4fr1bme,

,2

Septatber 1, 190$.

'Batton, Septanber 14,

1905.

'Which incidentaUy has ohanged many times in the tmSUr1ng years * 'the
Chicso Da11,l!!!!, recalls that the anniversary of the Portsmouth Oonference
oocun on the eve of the signing of the peace treaty off1ciallT raa:r1d.ng the
end of the wr between the tTmted states and

Japan.S3 One 1s tempted to

uk whether there 1s any relation between the two events.

I'1ght the second

peace treaty have been avoided by' a more eftectiYe Portsmouth Treaty? '1'0
az:t.n'fir

thts question \1Ould necessitate ones assuming the role

or an

arm-cba1r

strategist. Yet it can be seen that in the reporting of the conf'erence

t01"'bT rears

aftern..~ j

dq pllbllc opinion.

the writer treated the subj ect in llght of present

!bus "playing up" the fact that Russia

_8

thedeteated

nation and Japan was the v.Letorioue diplomat because of the fact that public
fa:vori ttan has once more sMlted toward Japan and awq from Iuseia.
So tar j the cbanges in public opinion have been discussed because

the policies ot state are today

large~

d1rected by what people believe.

fheir opin1on may be based upon error and m1e1ntonation, but if they believe

them sincerelyj they act upon them. !his 1s eepecial.l.7 true of a dEmocracy 7h
It is not enougb to oonsider the official relations between states.
It 1s imperative~ necessary to understand 1Ihat people are tb1nld ng about
their

ne1gbbor.SS

..

,

S3 ChleaE pailz News, Septsber 5, 19$1.
~ Treat,

$

-

JaE!!:!!!! United

s"tate~ ~tlons, p.

1911..

Ibid.
'III
I'
I

...
CONCLUSION
'the Japanese had entered into open conflict with Russia for a
cause which in the minds of the general public was just. Russia was considered to be

the aggressor ascending trom the North on its compal"ati"ely

tiny neighbor who, because of her smaller size, was thought to be the weaker

country.
povieP,

Because Japan had never Erltered into open conflict with a world

the world thought Japan would soon be overpowered.

!he tact that

Japan was able to make cOl'lSide:rable advances against Russia
parent to the rest of the world.

1'1&1

soon ap-

fhe war was bloody and costly and the

finances of both countries suffered to the extent that both were willing to

negotiate peaoe.

'l'his peace conference was made possible by the imitation

for their representatives to meet in the l1n1ted states.

At this timet the people ot the United states felt that Japan had
fought tor a just cause and. were more k1ndl.y disposed to Japan. than to

Russia. !he opinion _s that Japan had undertaken a

1IQ'

be70nd ber own

strength. fh1e caused a teeling of a,mpathy to develop in favor of Japan. 1
The L1 tEtra" D1sest $U!"'O"eY' said that at the outset ot the warI no paper

favored any other po1i.e,- than one of neutralit7, but an overwhelming number
, r.

))
openly expressed' their tull sympathy for Japan.2

'!'he preas generally bailed

every Japanese vietora' and did not disguise its hope that Russia would be

quickl7 and decisively'defeated.' 'liae had come

'When the

American people

"were constrained to say to Ruesia that they could no longer ~t h.... tth

!he Americans bad lost

tnth in Russia

until the enettgetic Sergius

Witte set about Winning over the Unitet;\ states press tD the Russian cause.;
His efforts along with ._. adverse cr1tLci_ of the Japaneee delegates were

so successful as to win for btm and the Russian cause the friendship
IIIlU'l7 .bI.er1cans..

ot

Therefore, as the peace negotiations ....... in pt"Ogt"eS8,

American public opinion had diverted fran the Japanese cause to that of
Russia.

Japan t s holding out tor an 1ndeBrm.ty to cover the coat of Dr
caused unpopular1V.. and e'Ven the delayed w1 tbdraal of their demand for an
indemnity.. which

1f&S

considered a diplomatic viotory b.1 some

nothirJg to w.Ln back A1Ier1can friendship toward Japan.

mters,

did

Some sections of the

Japanese populati.on l"eUted to the peace negotiations in riotious protests

agaiDBt America -

the scene of the negot.iations.

!be

ov~

of the

Shogmate and the increased mill tarization of the Japanese nation was an
I

ft •. t

2 Poater Rhea Dull~1 The Road to !eh...n, (Princeton, Hew Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 19l.14);-p'."1m:8T.'
'

h
,

Ibid.

-

Ibid ..

anti-climax to t\e feeling al1'eady held in the hearts of the American

people. 6 Skeptici8ll1 and suspicion at the Japanese victories, amb1 tions and
rurtber aims bad already spread throughout the oountry to the extent that
Japan was not trusted by the American public.

Rm_
affirmed
#.
rz

A. 1IX'itar in the rortn:tgh~

th1s statement when it said that the Japanese undoubtedly

suffered from revulsion of public opin1:0n through their milltary capabilities.? Japan's 'Y1ctories became .. drawback to her because the nations of
the 1I'01"1d began to look askance at her wondering where her strength m:1.ght

lead her. 8 !.bere was a decided tmdency for the world to transfer their
fear of :R.u$Bia to Japan.
When the Japane_ demand

tor

payment of an indemnity threatened

to cause a stalemate in the Portsmouth Conference. Russ1a
The Obi

DS

urged to yield.

cae Mbune said that John D. Rookef'eU.. bad been asked to give

Russia the money to pay the indemn1.ty and end the aJ'.9 !his paper also
said that President Roosevelt wrote Witte asld.ng bim to yield a fn da1$
after meeting with Jlr. laneko, a Japanese statesman, whom he bad asked to
withdraw the dema.nd.lO
I

r

6 Pa7$on J" !Nat, Ja
(Standord, California:

and the tTrd. ted states ~8S)-.lSl,

stantml E wralti1'iess, lHe); p7'"1Jj.

? A.. Stead. p. 6S2-6S3.

8 Ibid., p. 654.
9 Chi_Io tribune" August ZS, 19C5.
10

-Ibid.,

August 22,

1905.

S1
Desp1te1tU8sia'e persistence in retutdng to grant Japan an
indem:nitJr tor the cost of

to Japan.

war, any thought the d1plomatic victory belonged

!be ~h1oaE 'fr1.bune ~8$sed this idea when it said speaking

ot

Japan,
••• abDrd.ng tv reaching statesmanship of lttghest Ol'der and
w:t:th a magranimity that bas no paraUel1n history, nctorious JapIUl through her plen1potenta.r1es agreed this mormng
to make peace with Rusi•• ll .
!b& Japanese goyermaent did yield by wi tb.d:tning their demand. but
1Iri'hers did not agree as to who bad achieved. the mil1tary vict0J7 nor the

diplelaatic victory.

JIoat wr1 teN agree that both won cert&1n aspecta an4

both lost in other respects.

N&'V'erthe1ess, the fighting ceased oaueing re-

percussions in both countries.
The Russian reaction _s $1llI'JI'BIr1zed in tbe London
said that perhaps never in Russian history bad

clearl¥ ca:pressed the plain truth

or

t.am.ee which

the newspapers so bol.cJl.y and

the situation.

Still quoting a Russian

newspaper it said:

Can 1I'e ever forgive this regime which brought Russia so
low that she should bave to rejoice because she was not
compelled to pay an indemz:d ty and which sinoe August 19,
has began to recede into the past. Kuasia vr.1.11 never
forget this sbameless 'lII'ar.12
Oonditions in Japan are summa.rized in the following statements,

the tirst by Oount Okuma.
Oonditiona berore the war are liable to repetition
instead of removing any causes ot future disputes 'f;he
..

or

ill

..........

n

Oh:1cago tribune, August 30)

1905

12 f1mes (London) I September 7, 190" quoting !rom St. Petersburg.

...

the .nt1~ lett the oorJd1t1<ma exactly •• tb87 ....
before hosUlit1e8 bepn.U
.And

trc:a

the LoDdoa ftIIeal
r
. ..

....... 10_

MC\t<m8, ~al oreana, pointed out
tat the o'bjeot.tone to the war baVe been ~ attained,
at 1t 1t 1s to oont1nue to tight wUl ~ Japan to
...."oach of 8&Ori.tio1ng tbe 11.,. of people ei~ tor
......,or . . . . .1" ~t . . . . . . the world'. desire
t .. peaoe and tbe dicta_ 01" br.manityaN nmf _tist1ed.lL

!hen . . a ~ feeling of o~ tJ'l'rouIh J. . .1$

l'IritGn staw that tboee IlI08t
~ ~.

~

wMolt ~ 'bce1;illt.1. to

in the wtoome ~ the

~_e

til

~

tbat the:tr

8ecwtty be qnredJ and the tJm.ted states .'t4ob rejo1oed OYer tbe d1plollat1o
'ViO""" em tbe pa;rt at their
t1tt\t.ed

statee ..s

&

world

tbs det1n.tw eet&blt....nt of tbe

~.

mi.

In the Id.ue ,....
while doubt eJieted in the

C01"""".

~det and

~

,btl

~~

of the people,

War and the Wor14 WU',

~tions 11~ tri~

A goo4 und~ng and tbe t:-ad1tloral tY1endfiiJ:d.p ~.

!he time wUl.

come, 1Ir.rOte P43'IfOll J"

~t, wben

puWo

optrd.cm w1U

make and _ _ mtrrlaWN.16

II ••• -

,tT .... _

and

'F

'.1

13 l\!II (kmdoa),

S~ 8, lfOS.

1ttJ4.
15 llf4.

lh

16 ~ It fleat• . , . ~ M\:.~B''''~n..lSl
(staJd'.-d, Ca1ltOl'JdAU stanfOfid .:v'Eiirt.7
....), p. DIr.'"
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